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Beyond "Let Them Eat Cake": An
Argument for the Armendariz Method




Jane Doe is a twenty-two year old young woman who recently has been expe-
riencing problems at work. About two years ago, Jane took a job at a local fast-
food establishment, Bubba's, which is a subsidiary of a larger corporation. The
job has provided barely enough income for Jane to support herself and her two
year old daughter while she has been earning an associate teaching degree at the
local junior college. Jane planned to continue working at Bubba's while finishing
her degree, but the recent behavior of her supervisor has made her question
whether she will be able to continue working at all.
Throughout Jane's two years at Bubba's, John, her supervisor, has repeatedly
invited her to social gatherings outside of work. Jane has refused both because
she prefers to spend her time off with her daughter and because she is not interest-
ed in spending any more time with John than her job requires. Over time, John's
persistence has intensified. The other night, he made her uncomfortable by fol-
lowing her out to her car as she was leaving. She threatened to report him to the
General Manager, to which he replied, "Good luck," and walked away.
The next day, John's behavior did not change. Jane discussed reporting him
to the General Manager with a fellow female employee. Jane learned that this was
not the first time John had behaved this way. In fact, Jane was hired to fill the
vacancy that was left when the General Manager fired the last female employee to
complain about John's behavior. Also, John bragged at work that he was much
less replaceable than the non-management employees, and that "there's an endless
supply of waitresses that can pour coffee." Jane's fellow employee had heard that
after being fired, the former employee could not find another food service job in
the area because she had acquired a reputation for being a troublemaker.
Frustrated, Jane decided that she needed to talk to an attorney and set a meet-
ing with a local general practitioner. The attorney agreed to research the merits of
her claim for a one thousand dollar non-refundable retainer and meet with her to
discuss her options. Jane was reluctant to spend so much money with the possibil-
ity of hearing bad news, but the positive attitude of the attorney left her feeling
confident. She was proud of herself for making a copy of the agreement she
signed when she started working at Bubba's, and the attorney had commended her
for doing so when she handed it over. She counted the days until their next meet-
ing. However, when she met with the attorney again, she was given the following
assessment:
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ATTORNEY: Well Jane, the problem that we're going to run into with
your claim is that when you started working at Bubba's you signed a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement that covers "any and all disputes arising out
of your employment."
JANE: A what?
ATTORNEY: Arbitration is a process that's similar to suing someone
in court, only it typically allows for claims to be resolved faster, is gener-
ally cheaper, and can be more flexible because the arbitrator's award can
take into account a broader range of social and ethical considerations that
don't always make their way to a jury.1
JANE: So, that's good, right? I don't think I'm seeing the problem.
ATTORNEY: The problem is this cost-allocation provision. It says that
you agree to pay for half the costs of arbitration up front, and that you'll
be responsible for Bubba's other half if you lose.2
JANE: Okay. That sounds expensive. But didn't you say that arbitra-
tion was cheaper?
ATTORNEY: Well, it certainly can be cheaper, but typically only in
the long run. 3 The problem is upfront costs. The fee for filing a com-
plaint in federal court is $350. 4 The upfront fee for your claim, depend-
ing upon how much we're going after, could be anywhere from $950 to
$2,250.5
JANE: I gave you most of my spare cash for the retainer. Is there no
way around those upfront costs?
ATTORNEY: We can try to get a waiver or reduction, but it takes a
showing of extreme hardship.6 There's just no guarantee that you're
going to meet that standard; and, even if you did, that waiver wouldn't
1. See Clara H. Saafir, Comment, To Fee or Not to Fee: Examining Enforcement of Fee-Splitting
Provisions in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts, 48 LOY. L. REv. 87, 99-100
(2002).
2. The "loser pays" provision in Goodman v. ESPE Am., Inc., No. 00-CV-862, 2001 WL 64749 at
*3 n.2 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 19, 2001) provides an example of this type of cost-allocation provision.
3. See Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute
Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REv. 143, 159-
62 (2002). See also Saafir, supra note 1, at 99-100.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2000).
5. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingency Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L.
Rev. 729, 738-40 (2006) (citing AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, Rule R-49 (2005), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22 4 0#R 49)).
6. Id. at 740.
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even cover what we have to pay the arbitrator. 7 Plus, you've got to keep
in mind that whatever we try to prove, you're going to be paying me to
prove it.
8
JANE: That's kind of what I was hoping to talk to you about today.
When my dad broke his ankle at work, his attorney took his case, not for
free, that's not what I want to say...
ATTORNEY: On a contingency?
JANE: Yes.
ATTORNEY: I do sometimes take cases on a contingency fee basis.
But in your case, it's a little more complicated. You see, when I take
cases on a contingency basis, I'm putting up that $250 filing fee and
foregoing payment of my legal fees if we lose. For you, the upfront fees
are probably going to be a lot more than $250, which is more than I want
to risk. I think you'll find that most attorneys feel the same way.
9
JANE: But if we win you can recover your fees?
ATTORNEY: I'm not sure. Bubba's has a provision in your arbitration
agreement that limits your recovery to breach of contract damages, which
means that under the agreement, you can't recover attorney's fees.,0 So
far, the research that I've done has led me to believe that I can get around
this provision." But, the arbitration agreement also has a severability
7. Id. Drahozal writes:
As the AAA explains, "[s]ince every hardship request is unique and involves many variables, the
AAA reserves the right to deny or grant any request based on the information given by the re-
questing party." Note that even if the AAA waives its administrative fees, the waiver does not
include arbitrators' fees.
Id. at 740 (citations omitted). See also supra notes 4 and 5.
8. Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwil-
ling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 725-26 (2004) ("As Professor Malin has emphasized,
the deterrence impact is double-layered, for it includes the cost of challenging the cost-sharing. Invali-
dating the cost-sharing provision does nothing to discourage an employer from including such a clause
because it will deter others who lack the resources to challenge it in court." (citing Martin H. Malin,
Ethical Concerns in Drafting Employment Arbitration Agreements After Circuit City and Green Tree,
41 BRANDEIS L.J. 779, 791-95 (2003))).
9. See generally Drahozal, supra note 5, at 731-32 (noting higher costs and fees in the initial phases
of arbitration).
10. The "costs and fees" provision of the arbitration agreement in Perez v. Globe Airport Security
Services, Inc., 253 F.3d 1280 (1 1th Cir. 2001) provides an example of this type of cost-allocation
provision. The court's analysis of this provision is as follows:
The arbitration agreement states, "despite any rule providing that any one party must bear the
cost of filing and/or the arbitrator's fees, all costs of the American Arbitration Association and all
fees imposed by any arbitrator hearing the dispute, will be shared equally between you and the
Company." This provision circumscribes the arbitrator's authority to grant effective relief by
mandating equal sharing of fees and costs of arbitration despite the award of fees permitted a
prevailing party by Title VII.
Id. at 1285.
11. Summers, supra note 8, at 727-28.
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clause, which means that the arbitrator or court could hold that the attor-
ney's fees provision is severable from the rest of the agreement.' 2 In that
case, we still have to arbitrate, and it's quite common for arbitrators to
refuse to award costs and fees; or, worse yet, your fees may end up being
more than the award.' 3 And, frankly, it strikes me as unethical for me to
counsel you to pursue this arbitration when there's a good chance that it
could end up costing you so much. 14
JANE: How about this: there was another woman that this same thing
happened to before I got there. Is there any way that she and I could file
a claim together so that we can split the upfront costs?
ATTORNEY: What you're talking about, Jane, is a class action, and
Bubba's has a provision against that as well.' 5 Under the authority that
I've found so far, it seems unlikely that you'll be able to get that provi-
sion tossed out.' 6 I want to help you, Jane. I really do, but I just can't
say with any certainty that pursuing this claim is the best possible course
of action available to you right now.
Jane, not wanting to be labeled a troublemaker, decided to apply for other
jobs. She applied at the restaurant across the street from Bubba's, called Billy
Bob's. She did well in the interview and got the job. After she quit Bubba's and
just before she started work at her new job, the manager gave her a form that he
said she had to sign... .
12. Id. at 729-31 (citing Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 674-75 (6th Cir. 2003))
(wherein the court upheld a provision in the arbitration agreement that the stipulations as to costs and
fees were severable).
13. See Leroy & Feuille, supra note 3, at 161 (citing DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F.Supp.
459, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
14. This proposition is an arguable conclusion reached by the author after reading Malin, supra note
8, upon which reasonable attorneys could disagree.
15. The class action provision in Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 499-500 (4th Cir.
2002), provides an example of this type of cost-allocation provision.
16. Summers, supra note 8, at 728-29 (citing Adkins, 303 F.3d at 499-500 and Ingle v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003)).
17. For support for this hypothetical generally, see Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933
(4th Cir. 1999); for a court that upheld a similar arbitration agreement, see Adkins, 303 F.3d at 503.
(court upheld an arbitration agreement that imposed prohibitive costs on a day-laborer employee be-
cause the employee provided no "serious estimation of how much money is at stake for each individual
plaintiff."). See Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-Faire Arbitration Market and the Need for a Uniform
Federal Standard Governing Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 583 (2004):
Examples [of lopsided arbitration agreements] abound. In Prevot v. Phillips Petroleum Co., the
employer gave arbitration agreements-written in English--to Spanish-speaking employees, and
pressured the employees to sign the agreements immediately. In Morrison v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., the employer imposed a one-year cap on back pay, a two-year cap on front pay, and a $5000
cap on punitive damages in most cases. The employer also required employees to share the out-
of-pocket costs of arbitration, which the court estimated at between three and fifty times the out-
of-pocket costs of litigation. In McCaskill v. SCI Management Corp., the employer prohibited the
arbitrator from awarding attorneys' fees to employees who brought successful discrimination
claims. In Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., the employer limited depositions of em-
ployer representatives (but not depositions of plaintiff-employees) to "no more than four desig-
nated subjects." In Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., the employer required
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I. BACKGROUND
A. In General
The journey of the federal policy favoring arbitration, from the American Ar-
bitration Act of 192518 to the current state of mandatory employment and consum-
er arbitration has been fraught with surprises. 19 The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) makes no mention of cost allocation 20 and facially excludes employment
contracts from its scope.2' Section One states: "Nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 22 However, in Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,23 the Supreme Court adopted a narrow construc-
tion of Section One, holding that only employment contracts of transportation
workers were exempted from the FAA.24
The FAA also does not provide for the arbitration of statutory claims, as
Congress specifically limited its scope to "maritime transactions" and "com-
merce."25 In the 1953 case Wilko v. Swan,26 the Supreme Court voided an arbitra-
tion provision in a securities sales contract as an "invalid waiver of the substantive
law" created by § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.27 Lower courts interpreted
the holding in Wilko as a "public policy defense" to the enforcement of arbitration
provisions. 28 However, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,29 the Court held thatan employee does not forfeit his right to a judicial forum by pursuing arbitration
employees, as a condition of employment, to submit all employment claims to arbitration, but the
employer retained the right to litigate any claims it might have against the employees. In Ingle v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., the employer imposed a statute of limitations much shorter than the li-
mitations period imposed by law, prohibited class actions, and required employees to pay a "fil-
ing fee" directly to the employer as a prerequisite for bringing a claim. In Hooters of Am., Inc. v.
Phillips, the employer required that arbitrators be chosen from a panel created exclusively by the
employer (which would have permitted the employer to place its own managers on the list), and
reserved the right to amend the arbitration rules at any time with no notice (which would have
permitted the employer to change the rules of arbitration in the middle of an arbitration proceed-
ing). Nor are overreaching employers likely to limit themselves to only one or two types of over-
reaching: in many of the cases cited above, courts refused to enforce the arbitration agreement
because the agreement overreached in as many as eight different ways. And while the cases cited
above all are employment arbitration cases, consumer arbitration cases provide a similar litany.
Courts generally agree that exceptionally lopsided arbitration agreements, such as the ones cited
above, should not be enforced. There is a wide range of variation, however, on the point at
which an arbitration agreement becomes sufficiently lopsided to justify non-enforcement.
Id. at 607-08 (citations omitted).
18. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
19. Bales, supra note 17, at 588-607.
20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
22. Id.
23. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
24. Id. at 113-19.
25. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14.
26. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
27. See Bales, supra note 17, at 589.
28. Id. (citing American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir.
1968); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 444 F. Supp. 68, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
29. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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of a Title VII discrimination claim under a collective bargaining agreement be-
cause arbitrators do not have the authority to decide statutory claims.
0
In the two decades between Wilko and Alexander, the Court increasingly be-
gan to favor arbitration as a means of reducing the federal docket and providing a
faster and inexpensive forum for resolving disputes in the context of labor arbitra-
tion.31 In a series of cases in the late 1980s known as the Mitsubishi Trilogy,32 the
Court expanded the federal policy favorin3 arbitration from collective bargaining
to the arbitration of employment disputes. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,34 the Court first articulated the principle that a party does
not forego statutory rights by submitting its claim to arbitration, but merely sub-
mits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. 35 In the third
case of the Mitsubishi Trilogy, the Court overruled Wilko.
36
The Court then laid the foundation for its current approach to cost allocation
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.37 In this case, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that arbitration agreements should be voided due to the coer-
cion often applied by employers in obtaining the employee's signature. 38 The
court held that "mere inequality in bargaining power... is not a sufficient reason
to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment con-
text."39 Also, in the commercial and collective bargaining contexts, the Court's
interpretation of the FAA has been resolutely contractualist.40 Emphasizing the
proportional bargaining power of the parties, the Court has held that such agree-
ments can determine the choice of law,41 as well as specify the types of damag-
es.
42
Courts at first noted that proportional bargaining power cannot be assumed in
employment and consumer contracts.43 In Cole v. Burns International Security
Services,an a 1997 D.C. Circuit case, Judge Harry Edwards outlined five criteria
that must be included in mandatory employment arbitration agreements in order to
adequately protect an employee seeking to vindicate statutorily created rights.
The agreement must:
30. Id. at 49-57.
31. Bales, supra note 17, at 589. vz
32. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985); Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987); and Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479, 484-85 (1989).
33. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483-85.
37. 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also Bales, supra note 17, at 596-600.
38. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
39. Id.
40. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468,479 (1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58-64 (1995).
41. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
42. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 58.
43. See, e.g., Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Shankle v. B-G Maint.
Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134
F.3d 1054 (11 th Cir. 1998); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000). See also Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000).
44. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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(1) provide[] for neutral arbitrators, (2) provide[] for more than mi-
nimal discovery, (3) require[] a written award, (4) provide[] for all
of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and
(5) ...not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or
any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbi-
tration forum.
45
In regards to cost allocation, the Cole court was particularly concerned about
the deterrence effect of requiring employees to pay arbitration costs in excess of
court filing fees and other administrative expenses. 46 This approach to the cost
allocation issue established the D.C. Circuit as the first jurisdiction to adopt a rule
that the imposition of excessive costs under a fee-splitting provision renders an
arbitration agreement unenforceable.47 After Cole, the majority of courts that
considered the cost allocation issue interpreted the imposition of costs beyond
those required for litigation as a bar to enforcement of the arbitration agreement.48
Then, in 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision in Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph49 that took a different stand as far as plaintiffs
arbitration costs and whether they make an arbitration agreement unenforceable.
50
Green Tree is significant not only for establishing Supreme Court precedent for
the case-by-case approach to cost allocation, but also because Green Tree in-
volved a consumer, not an employer-employee dispute. 5' The holding of Green
Tree and its impact on cost-splitting provisions in employment contracts
represents a marriage of consumer and employment arbitration in regards to cost
allocation.
52
In Green Tree, the plaintiff, who had financed her mobile home through
Green Tree Financial Corporation, sued for violations of the Truth in Lending Act
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.53 After the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama granted Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration,
pursuant to a contract requiring arbitration of all disputes, the plaintiff appealed
her case to the Eleventh Circuit. 54 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the plaintiff
that the agreement's silence as to who would bear the costs of arbitration sub-
45. Id. at 1482 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). 'The deci-
sion in Cole has received considerable attention because of its scholarly analysis, its comprehensive-
ness, and because its author, Chief Judge Harry Edwards, was a highly respected labor law professor
and arbitrator prior to his appointment to the bench." Malin, supra note 8, at 788.
46. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484.
47. John F. Crawford, Note, Going Dutch: Should Employees Have to Split the Costs of Arbitration
in Disputes Arising from Mandatory Employment Arbitration Agreements?, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 277,
280.
48. Malin, supra note 8, at 790. See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d
1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998);
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). See also Floss v. Ryan's
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
49. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
50. Malin, supra note 8, at 790-91.
51. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 94-95 (Ginsburg, J., concurring & dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 82-83.
54. Id. at 83-84.
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jected the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk.55 However, on appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed by a 5-4 vote.56
Reasoning from the federal policy favoring arbitration, the Court analogized
the enforceability of prohibitive costs provisions to the enforceability of the arbi-
tration of statutory claims.57 The Court stated that previous holdings had estab-
lished that the plaintiff seeking to avoid arbitration of a statutory claim has the
burden of proving that "Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the statutory
claims at issue." 8 The Court concluded that the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion demands the same result in terms of costs provisions: the plaintiff has the
burden of proving that costs would be prohibitive under the arbitration agree-
ment.
59
B. Methods of Interpreting Prohibitive Costs Provisions: The Per Se Rule
Versus Judicial Review
The holdings in Cole and Green Tree represent the two general methods of
interpreting prohibitive costs provisions: per se unenforceability versus judicial
review of the plaintiffs ability to pay the costs of arbitration under the agree-
ment.60 Under the per se method, if an arbitration agreement is presented to an
employee as a condition of employment, the costs of arbitration are assessed
against the employer at the time that the employer moves to compel arbitration.6'
This rule contemplates that employees will bear the amount of costs that is tradi-
tionally associated with filing a claim in court. 62 Costs are assessed at the "mo-
tion to compel" stage in order to avoid the double-layered deterrence effect of
judicial review. 63 The first layer of deterrence results from the risk that the arbi-
trator may require the employee to pay substantial arbitration costs under the
agreement.64 The second layer of deterrence stems from the attorneys fees and
court costs associated with proving to a reviewing court that the first layer of costs
are prohibitive (following an appeal of the trial court's granting the motion to
compel).65 Judicial review of prohibitive costs provisions, the method endorsed
by the Supreme Court in Green Tree,6 6 does not consider the deterrence effect of
double-layered costs, opting instead to focus on the federal policy favoring arbi-
tration.67 Judicial review of costs allocation can occur prior to the arbitration dur-
55. Id. at 84.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 91-92.
58. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)); Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
59. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92.
60. Crawford, supra note 47, at 280-81.
61. See, e.g., Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
62. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484.
63. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 687 (2000). See also Summers,
supra note 8, at 725.
64. See Summers, supra note 8, at 725.
65. See id. at 725-26.
66. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).
67. Id. at 91. See also Malin, supra note 8, at 794-95; Crawford, supra note 47, at 286; Morrison v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663-65 (6th Cir. 2003).
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ing the plaintiffs appeal of the motion to compel, or after the arbitration during
the plaintiff's appeal of the arbitrator's award. 68 The advantage of post-arbitration
judicial review is that it allows courts to make a direct comparison of the actual
costs of the arbitration at issue with the plaintiffs ability to pay without specula-
tion.69 However, this approach has been criticized for a variety of reasons, partic-
ularly because the narrow scope of review for arbitration awards will likely prec-
lude the plaintiffs recovery of arbitration costs. 70 Only two circuits, the Seventh
and the First, have utilized post arbitration judicial review.7'
The Green Tree court implicitly endorsed pre-arbitration judicial review of
costs allocation provisions by making its determination prior to requiring the par-
ties to proceed to arbitration.72 The Green Tree "case-by-case" method of judicial
review focuses on the individual plaintiffs ability to meet the cost burden under
the arbitration agreement.73 However, due to the ambiguous record in this case,
the Court avoided the task of defining this standard: "The record reveals only the
arbitration agreement's silence on the subject, and that fact alone is plainly insuf-
ficient to render it unenforceable. 74
In applying Green-Tree's individualized, "case-by-case" approach, circuit
courts have chosen two different methods of pre-arbitration judicial review: the
75 76
"integrated" approach and the "general deterrence" approach. In Bradford v.
Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc.,77 the Fourth Circuit developed the inte-
grated approach by adding two inquiries to the Green Tree "individual claimant's
ability to pay" standard: the expected cost differential between the arbitral forum
and litigation, and "whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the
bringing of claims. '78 Citing Gilmer, the court analyzed the cost issue as an as-
pect of the adequacy of the arbitral forum for vindicating the plaintiff's statutory
rights, reasoning that prohibitive costs necessarily make for an inadequate fo-
rum.79 The Fourth Circuit dismissed the Cole per se rule as being too focused on
where the money is going (i.e., to an arbitrator versus a judge) as opposed to a
costs comparison between arbitration and litigation as a whole.80 In this sense, the
court did not analyze the impact that the higher upfront costs of arbitration may
have on a potential claimant.
68. Crawford, supra note 47, at 281.
69. Id. at 285.
70. See Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000); Crawford, supra note 47, at 284-
85.
71. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1999); Kove-
leskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999).
72. See generally Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
73. Id. at 91-92.
74. Id. at 91.
75. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that
courts should focus, among other things, upon the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees and
costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that cost
differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims).
76. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the deterrence
factor is the only proper consideration when determining whether or not a cost allocation provision is
unduly prohibitive).
77. 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
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In Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., however, the Sixth Circuit at-
tempted to address the issue of prohibitive up-front costs by focusing exclusively
on whether the cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of
claims.82 The Morrison court laid out a multi-step process for making the "prohi-
bitive" determination: (1) Identify a class of litigants based on job description and
socioeconomic background; (2) without conducting a detailed analysis of the indi-
vidual plaintiffs resources, examine the individual plaintiffs ability to pay as
representative of the class; (3) determine the difference between the average costs
of arbitration for that class and the average costs of arbitrating a similar claim, not
focusing on the costs of the particular arbitration before the court; (4) determine
the costs of litigation, taking into account the pervasion of contingency fee agree-
ments; and (5) consider the likelihood that similarly situated plaintiffs would be
deterred from bringing a claim due to prohibitive CoStS.
83
The case-by-case method runs contrary to the prevailing persuasive authority
that preceded the decision in Green-Tree.84 As previously mentioned, following
Cole, the majority of courts considering the issue interpreted the imposition of
excessive costs as a bar to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.85 This
per se rule was well-received by the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits.86 These circuits
recognized Cole as an extension of Gilmer's holding that the federal policy favor-
ing arbitration is not without limits, particularly in regards to arbitration agree-
ments that effectively deprive the plaintiff of access to a neutral forum.
8 7
In a seminal case preceding Green Tree, Armendariz v. Foundational Health88
Psychcare Services, Inc., the California Supreme Court adopted a version of the
per se rule allowing the parties to proceed to arbitration by severing a prohibitive
cost allocation provision at the time of the motion to compel and imposing costs
on the party that mandated the arbitration agreement. 89 Armendariz involved a
mandatory arbitration agreement requiring arbitration of all claims under the Cali-
fornia Fair Employment and Housing Act.9° The agreement was subject to a pro-
vision of the California Civil Code that required each party to pay a pro rata share
of arbitration costs.91 The court, citing Cole's interpretation of Gilmer, held that
an employee subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement cannot be required to
pay costs beyond that of litigation filing fees. 92 The court reasoned that such costs
81. 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003).
82. Id. at 658 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The arbitration of statutory claims must be accessible to potential
litigants as well as adequate to protect the rights in question so that arbitration, like the judicial resolu-
tion of disputes, will 'further broader social purposes."' (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991))).
83. Id. at 663-65.
84. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Paladino v. Avnet
Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11 th Cir. 1998); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo.,
Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1999).
85. See supra note 48.
86. See Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062; Shankle, 163 F.3d at 1233-34.
87. See Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062; Shankle, 163 F.3d at 1234 & n.3.
88. 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
89. Id.
90. Id. See also CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 12900-12906 (2005).
91. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 685.
92. Id. at 685-87.
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deter the filing of statutory and constitutional claims in a manner that is on par
with an outright denial of those rights.93
The Armendariz court required the determination as to costs be made at the
time of the motion to compel, as opposed to the judicial review stage.94 By mak-
ing the prohibitive costs determination at the time of the motion to compel, the
court avoided the deterrence effect of forcing the employee to incur legal and
other fees to obtain additional judicial review. 95 The court followed the Cole
principle that the "arbitration agreement or ... process cannot generally require
the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would not be required
to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court." 96 The court also fol-
lowed the Cole principle: "[T]he above rule is fair, inasmuch as it places the cost
of arbitration on the party that imposes it."
9 7
In the same manner as Cole, the Armendariz court did not purport to invali-
date the arbitration agreement on the basis of costs alone. 98 In fact, the court ex-
plicitly stated in its holding: "The absence of specific provisions on arbitration
costs would . . . not be grounds for denying the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement." 99 The court required that the party that imposed the mandatory arbi-
tration agreement be responsible for "all types of costs that are unique to arbitra-
tion.' ' ° The court specifically excluded the costs provision from its discussion of
both unconscionability and severability.' 0' Despite the controversial nature of the
holding of Armendariz, and after the holding in Green-Tree,10 2 California, New
Mexico, and Oklahoma have codified provisions that are similar to the California
Supreme Court's treatment of prohibitive costs in mandatory arbitration agree-
ments in post-Green-Tree legislation.
10 3
It is also worth noting that in the related area of labor law,'14 cost allocation
provisions have been interpreted in a manner that parallels Cole and Armenda-
riz.105 In Bond v. Twin Cities Carpenters Pension Fund,1°6 the Eighth Circuit
considered a retired union carpenter's claim that the cost allocation provision of
93. Id. at 686.
94. Id. at 687 ("Because we conclude the imposition of substantial forum fees is contrary to public
policy, and is therefore grounds for invalidating or 'revoking' an arbitration agreement and denying a
petition to compel arbitration ... we hold that the cost issues should be resolved not at the judicial
review stage but when a court is petitioned to compel arbitration.").
95. Id.
96. Id. ("[W]e conclude that when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of
employment, the arbitration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally require the employee to
bear any type of expense that the employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free to
bring the action in court.").
97. Id. at 688.
98. Id. at 689-94.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 696-97. The Court identified the agreement's multiple unlawful provisions: an unlawful
damages provision and an unconscionably unilateral arbitration clause, as well as the agreement's lack
of mutuality, as being the primary grounds for unenforceability. Id.
102. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability,
52 BuFF. L. REV. 185, 207-09 (2004).
103. See Drahozal, supra note 5, at 757-58.
104. See 2 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 45:3 (2007).
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the mandatory arbitration agreement contained in the pension plan restricted
access to a reasonable opportunity for a full and fair review of benefits determina-
tions.107 This type of review is statutorily guaranteed by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Programl' (ERISA).' 9 The Court's opinion was based on a
Department of Labor opinion letter, 110 which states that when a pension plan re-
quires participants to submit to arbitration, cost-splitting contravenes the reasona-
bleness standard set forth in section 2560.503-1(b)(3) of the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations."'l Therefore, the court held that the cost-splitting provision requiring the
participants to bear half of the costs of arbitration violated the reasonableness
standard and was unenforceable.112
A comparison of the costs of litigation and arbitration further illustrates the
problem of double-layered deterrence discussed in Armendariz and Bond."3 The
American Arbitration Association requires the following filing fees for the arbitra-
tion of disputes arising under individual employment contracts:"14
Amount in Dispute Initial Filing Fee Case Service Fee Total
Up to $10,000 $500 j $200 $700
<$75,000 $750 $300 $1050
<$150,000 $1500 $750 $2250
<$300,000 $ 2750 $1250 $4000
<$500,000 $4250 $1750 $6000
The initial filing fee for individual employment arbitration under employer-
imposed agreements is capped at $125; however, as the above table illustrates,
significant costs are assessed in addition to the initial filing fee. 1 5 Also, unlike in
litigation, the parties to an arbitration agreement must also pay the arbitrator.
116
Arbitrators' typical fees can range from $3,000 to $14,000 and can be much high-
er when a dispute involves difficult determinations."17
107. Id. at 705-06.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000).
109. Bond, 307 F.3d at 706.
110. Id. See Department of Labor Opinion Letter No. 82-46A (1982).
111. Id. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(3) (2007) states in pertinent part:
The claims procedures for a plan will be deemed to be reasonable only if [t]he claims procedures
do not contain any provision, and are not administered in a way, that unduly inhibits or hampers
the initiation or processing of claims for benefits. For example, a provision or practice that re-
quires payment of a fee or costs as a condition to making a claim or to appealing an adverse ben-
efit determination would be considered to unduly inhibit the initiation and processing of claims
for benefits.
112. Bond, 307 F.3d at 707.
113. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 687 (Cal. 2000). See Summers,
supra note 8, at 696-98.
114. Nat'l Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, at heading "Administrative Fee Sche-
dule" and subheading "Fees" following R. 42 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 2004); see also Code of Proce-
dure, App. C, at 37-46 (Nat'l Arbitration Forum 2003) (specifying the fee schedule for the National
Arbitration Forum).
115. Summers, supra note 8, at 696-97.
116. Id.
117. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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C. Severability
In addition to applying a per se rule, the Armendariz court endorsed the seve-
rability of unlawful provisions within arbitration agreements." 8 Severability, or
the practice of severing "illegal" portions of contracts and enforcing the remaind-
er,' 19 is widely employed in the modern judicial treatment of contracts.1 20 How-
ever, its use is not without tension as the concept runs afoul of the longstanding
judicial policy of not interfering with the freedom to contract by rewriting the
parties' terms. 2 1 Despite the courts' stated reluctance to sever unlawful provi-
sions, the doctrine has been applied in the areas of collective bargaining and em-
ployment contract interpretation. 122 Additionally, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Manufacturing Co., 123 the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed severability of
the arbitration agreement itself when it held that a claim of fraud in the induce-
ment of the entire contract would not allow the claimant to bypass an otherwise
valid arbitration agreement contained therein. 24
In cases involving the unconscionability or illegality of provisions contained
in arbitration agreements, however, the issue of severability has been all but ig-
nored in favor of rendering the entire agreement unenforceable. 25 Also, the few
cases that do discuss severability diverge in application. 26 In Armendariz, for
example, the court endorsed the application of severability, but refused to sever
the unenforceable provisions of the agreement due to "multiple defects" [that]
indicate[d] "a systematic effort to impose arbitration on an employee not simply
as an alternative to litigation, but as an inferior forum that works to the employer's
advantage."'' 2 7 On the other hand, in Morrison, the Sixth Circuit allowed for the
severance of multiple provisions requiring cost-splitting, limiting back pay, front
pay, and punitive damages, and allowing attorney's fees only at the discretion of
the arbitrator. 2 8 In the article Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights,
Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, Professor Clyde W. Summers identifies a
problem inherent in Morrison's application of severability that has significant
implications for costs allocation:
118. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 697 (Cal. 2000). Cole implicitly severed the prohibitive costs provision
by allowing the dispute to proceed to arbitration. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483-84.
119. Also known as "blue penciling." 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 318 (2007).
120. 17A AM JUR. 2D Contracts § 318, n.3 (2007).
121. Summers, supra note 8, at 729.
122. 14 A.L.R.2d 846 (2007); 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 318 (2007) (see note 16 and accompa-
nying text).
123. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
124. Id. at 406-07.
125. Summers, supra note 8, at 729 ("In most cases, severability is never discussed and the whole
arbitration agreement is declared unenforceable.").
126. Id.
Where several objectionable provisions must be severed, the court may say that this goes beyond
mere excision to rewriting the contract, which is not the proper role of this Court or that, a court
may, in its discretion, refuse to enforce the contract as a whole if it is permeated by the uncons-
cionability. But McCaskill held that denial of attorney's fees, the single right of a winning plain-
tiff, was sufficient to make the whole arbitration agreement unenforceable.
Id. (quoting McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir.)) (Internal quotation marks
omitted).
127. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 697 (Cal. 2000).
128. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2003).
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[Severance], of course, did not deprive the employer of its ill-gotten
gain- the in terrorem effect of these provisions on those deterred from
pursuing their claims-a rather surprising result when the court had ex-
plicitly measured the enforceability of these provisions according to their
deterrence effect on others similarly situated. 
129
The "double-layered" nature of costs deterrence is a formidable hurdle to
overcome if severability is to have any impact in terms of redressing the cohe-
siveness of employment and consumer arbitration agreements.' 30 This concern is
particularly relevant in light of the Eleventh Circuit's argument in Perez v. Globe
Airport Security Services, Inc., 131 that widespread application of severance could
in fact create an incentive for employers to include unconscionable or unenforcea-
ble provisions.' 32 Professor Summers' solution to this poisoned limb is to cut
down the tree by refusing to enforce that arbitration agreement as a whole.'
33
However, as the following will contend, this conclusion is not inevitable, as appli-
cation of the Armendariz per se rule allows employment and consumer disputes to
proceed to arbitration without saddling the non-imposing party with double-
layered prohibitive costs.
HI. COMMENT
The dilemma inherent in mandatory employment and consumer arbitration is
epitomized by the lawyer's statement to Jane in the above hypothetical: "You've
got to keep in mind that whatever we try to prove, you're going to be paying me to
prove it."' 34 The proposed methods for case-by-case judicial review of cost allo-
cation are wholly inadequate at resolving this problem due to the risk imposed on
the plaintiff that the reviewing court will not rule in her favor.' 35 At the time of
the motion to compel, the court that decides to compel arbitration should apply (1)
a per se rule that imposes costs on the party that presented the arbitration agree-
ment as a condition of employment or purchase, and (2) the severability doctrine
to the prohibitive costs provision. This method, as applied in Armendariz, is the
only method of costs allocation that allows the parties to proceed to arbitration
without the deterrence effect of double-layered costs.
129. Summers, supra note 8, at 730.
130. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
131. Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 294 F.3d 1275
(11 th Cir. 2002).
132. Id.
133. Among other comparable solutions, Professor Summers offers the following:
The cures for this sick body of law ... are surprisingly simple and obvious, even if courts will
not change their holdings and employers will not change their practices. The FAA could be
amended to say explicitly what it was originally intended to say, that it did not apply to contracts
of employment, legislatively overruling Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. More appropriately,
the FAA might be amended to render unenforceable mandatory arbitration provisions in all adhe-
sion contracts, so as to reach consumer, credit, and service contracts where mandatory arbitration
similarly deprives plaintiffs of their statutory rights.
Summers, supra note 8, at 731-32 (citation omitted).
134. See generally Summers, supra note 8.
135. See Summers, supra note 8, at 723-27; Malin, supra note 8, at n.66.
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A. The Failure of the Case-By-Case Method to Address Double-Layered
Deterrence
The case-by-case approach endorsed by Green Tree and its progeny, namely
Bradford and Morrison, is far and away the most widely touted method.' 36 How-
ever, criticism has been directed at its focus on the individual plaintiff without
consideration of the systemic effects of double-layered prohibitive costs.' 37 Cir-
cuit courts following Green Tree have confirmed this criticism, particularly by
citing Green Tree when upholding "loser pays" provisions, which mandate that
the non-prevailing party be saddled with the entire costs of arbitration.' 38 For
example, in Musnick v. King Motor Co. 139 the Eleventh Circuit upheld an arbitra-
tion agreement with the following provision:
The prevailing party shall be awarded costs including reasonable attor-
neys' fees, filing fee, subpoena service and witness fee, deposition and
hearing transcription costs and similar expenses .... In cases where a
party asserts any claim, position or defense, which is not substantially
justified by the law or facts, the arbitrator shall award to the opposing
party that party's reasonable attorney's fees incurred as a result of that
party's defending any such claim, position or defense.1
4 0
The court cited Green Tree for the conclusion that an arbitration agreement
cannot be rendered unenforceable "merely because it may involve some 'fee-
shifting."- 14 ' There is no greater testament to the inadequacy of Green Tree's
case-by-case approach than the failure of lower courts to consider the deterrence
effect that an indeterminate case-by-case evaluation has on the employee or con-
sumer seeking arbitration. Holdings such as the Eleventh Circuit's in Musnick
frustrate the federal policy favoring arbitration by preventing valid arbitrable
claims from ever being brought. 142
136. Malin, supra note 8, at 791 (citing, e.g., Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (1 1th Cir. 2002);
Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2002); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys.,
Inc., 238 F. 3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001); Boyd v. Hayneville, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2001)).
Drahozal, supra note 5, at 747-48 ("Virtually every circuit to have addressed the question since Green
Tree has adopted a case-by-case approach to cost-based challenges.").
137. Malin, supra note 8, at 794; Crawford, supra note 47, at 286; Morrison v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663-65 (6th Cir. 2003).
138. See Saafir, supra note 1, at 99-100 (ciing Goodman v. ESPE Am., Inc., No. 00-CV-862, 2001
WL 64749, *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2001); Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1258-60 (1 lth
Cir. 2003) (requiring plaintiff to arbitrate Title VII claim pursuant to agreement that provided for
award to costs and attorney fees to prevailing party); Manuel v. Honda R & D Ams., Inc., 175 F. Supp.
2d 987, 991-95 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (enforcing arbitration provision that imposed arbitrator's fees and
other costs on the losing party); Thompson v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 300 F.3d 88, 91-92 (1st Cir.
2002) (confirming arbitration award that required non-prevailing plaintiff to pay the entirety of defen-
dant employer's attorney fees)).
139. 325 F.3d 1255.
140. Id. at 1257.
141. Id. at 1259.
142. See supra section I.A for an overview of the federal policy favoring arbitration.
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Prior to Musnick, the Eleventh Circuit in Perez v. Globe Airport Security Ser-
vice, Inc. 14 3 took an interesting approach to an employer's mandatory cost-
splitting provision, holding that such a limitation on the arbitrator's remedial au-
thority rendered the agreement unenforceable. 144 While certainly more employee-
friendly than the previously mentioned case-by-case incarnations, such an ap-
proach still perpetuates the double-layered dice roll inherent in submitting the
employee's challenge in the first place.
145
The "general deterrence" approach in Morrison, which focuses on the effect
of prohibitive costs on the class of employees that are similarly situated to the
plaintiff, has been offered as the medicine for the deterrence effect of the indivi-
dualized case-by-case approach.146 However, as a general matter, identifying a
class of litigants has proven significantly difficult. 147 For example, in Haro v.
NCR Corp.,148 the Southern District of Ohio accepted the plaintiffs definition of
his "class" as "former NCR employees over the age of forty who have been re-
leased from employment since January 2004 due to economic reasons and who
were given a bonus and/or merit increase in 2004. ' '149 Such a narrow definition of
"class" renders the "general deterrence" approach indistinguishable from the indi-
vidualized Green Tree approach, as it is highly unlikely that there will be a suffi-
cient number of future plaintiffs within the scope of the class.
Beyond this difficulty in application, the conceptual underpinnings of the
Morrison opinion accomplish very little in terms of mitigating the deterrence im-
pact of double-layered costs. In the article Going Dutch: Should Employees Have
to Split the Costs of Arbitration in Disputes Arising from Mandatory Employment
Arbitration Agreements, experienced international arbitrator John F. Crawford
explains the advantages of the Morrison method:
The case-by-case approach raised in Green Tree, and the subsequent
standard set forth in Bradford, attempt to bring a more logical approach
to the cost-splitting issue, but they also raise additional problems. Main-
ly, the case-by-case approach places a large burden on the employee be-
cause costs associated with an arbitration, which courts using this ap-
proach require employees to estimate, are much "too speculative" at the
initial stages of a dispute. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Morrison looks
at the "whole picture" when attempting to determine the validity of a
cost-splitting provision. The court's standard does not attempt to decide
the issue for an individual claimant in a particular case. The court recog-
nizes that employers often discriminate on a consistent basis and that in
order for all employees to "effectively have their rights vindicated," the
143. 253 F.3d 1280 (1 th Cir. 2001), vacated, 294 F.3d 1275 (2002).
144. Id. at 1285-86.
145. See Malin, supra note 8, at 795 ("There are post-Green Tree precedents that continue to police
arbitration agreements closely for procedural fairness. However, several of them have been qualified
substantially, undermining their effectiveness.").
146. Crawford, supra note 47, at 286.
147. See generally Bales, supra note 17, at 626 ("Unfortunately, while courts are searching for non-
existent standards to guide their decisions, consumers and employees are being subjected to a laissez-
faire labor market for arbitration.").
148. Haro v. NCR Corp., No. 3-:04-CV-328, 2006 WL 2990386 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2006).
149. Id. at *2.
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cost-splitting issue must be decided for the group, not just one individual
in a given case.
150
Although Crawford is a bit generous in connecting Morrison to precedent,
151
the above sufficiently outlines the advantages of the general deterrence approach
over the case-by-case analysis of Green Tree. However, it certainly seems remiss
for the Sixth Circuit to discuss how the "burden" on the employee is eased by
calculating deterrence in terms of class-wide prohibitive costs as opposed to indi-
vidual prohibitive costs, and in the same opinion provide no consideration of the
glaring problem inherent in requiring the employee to prove any prohibitive costs
in the first place.' 52  The value of looking at the "whole picture" of class-wide
deterrence costs is limited due to the variety ofplaintiffs likely to come before the
courts, and the difficulty of defining a class. The Bradford approach, which
considers both class-wide and individual deterrence costs, is merely a synthesis of
the individualized and general deterrence methods.1 54 As those two methods fail
to address the deterrence effect of prohibitive costs, the integrated approach is
necessarily subject to the same criticism.
The primary advantage asserted in favor of any case-by-case judicial review
of costs allocation is that the "sophisticated wealthy employee," or a class thereof
in terms of Morrison, will not be able to avoid an otherwise valid contractual
agreement by falsely claiming that the arbitration costs would prohibit bringing a
claim.' 55 This "advantage" begs the question, "What do sophisticated employees
have to fear from arbitration?" In the event of termination, the sophisticated,
well-compensated employee, by definition, is much more likely to find adequate
150. Crawford, supra note 47, at 286 (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 284. Crawford's above statement concerning the relationship between Morrison and
Green Tree is a reference to the following statement made earlier in the article, which is a patently
erroneous interpretation:
In Green Tree, the United States Supreme Court eased the circuit courts' resistance towards cost-
splitting provisions. However, Green Tree provided little guidance about when a cost-splitting
provision in a mandatory arbitration agreement should be enforceable. The Sixth Circuit in the
instant case provides a clear and logical analysis derived from the Fourth Circuit's approach in
Bradford. Id.
In the article Let's Get A Vision: Drafting Effective Arbitration Agreements In Employment and Effect-
ing Other Safeguards to Insure Equal Access to Justice, Professor Laurie Leader makes the following
statement regarding Morrison, which is decidedly more accurate:
In Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., the Sixth Circuit considered the deterrent effect of arbi-
tration costs and the plaintiffs financial instability in determining whether to pursue arbitration,
where the risks of expending 'scarce resources' would reap 'uncertain benefit[s].' This approach
involved an expansive reading of Green Tree, since the Green Tree holding only considered
whether arbitration is cost-prohibitive to the individual plaintiff.
Laurie Leader & Melissa Burger, Let's Get A Vision: Drafting Effective Arbitration Agreements in
Employment and Effecting Other Safeguards to Insure Equal Access to Justice, 8 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 87, 99 (2004) (citation omitted).
152. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663-64 (6th Cir. 2003). See also supra note
8.
153. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
154. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001). Despite having
preceded Morrison, the second and third prongs are a paraphrasing of the general deterrence method.
See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003). The first prong is a restatement
of the holding in Green Tree. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000).
155. Crawford, supra note 47, at 285.
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employment quickly, as well as to comfortably endure an extended period of un-
employment. Also, she is better able to afford experienced counsel that can effec-
tively guide her through the arbitration process. Particularly when one takes into
account, contrary to popular perception, that arbitration may in fact be preferable
to litigation for the recently dismissed employee,' 5 6 it becomes less and less clear
why such great measures are taken to protect employers from these sophisticated
shirkers at the expense of deterring an indeterminably high number of employees
from seeking resolution of their claims. 1
57
Application of the Armendariz per se rule could and perhaps inevitably will
allow some sophisticated wealthy employees to avoid the costs of arbitration at
the expense of their employer. Such a consequence would be unfair to the em-
ployer and should certainly be taken into consideration by the arbitrator when
determining the substance of any award to the employee. However, a far greater
unfairness results when the threat of arbitration costs is utilized by employers as a
tool of intimidation, thereby chilling the remedies made available through the
pursuit of statutory claims. 158 To borrow an analogy from criminal jurisprudence,
"[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."' 159 The
same logic applies here: in general, it is be better to let ten sophisticated em-
ployees shirk arbitration costs than to let one employee with a valid statutory
claim lose any chance at resolution. Particularly when one considers the cost
advantage to employers in utilizing arbitration over litigation on the whole, 16° it
offends common sense to then conclude that employers should enjoy the further
advantage of having valid claims deterred by prohibitive cost allocation provisions
in adhesive agreements.
156. Consider this quote from Cole v. Bums Int'l Security Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997):
[L]itigation has become a less-than-ideal method of resolving employees' public law claims. As
spelled out in the Fact Finding Report, employees bringing public law claims in court must en-
dure long waiting periods as governing agencies and the overburdened court system struggle to
find time to properly investigate and hear the complaint. Moreover, the average profile of em-
ployee litigants ... indicates that lower-wage workers may not fare as well as higher-wage pro-
fessionals in the litigation system; lower-wage workers are less able to afford the time required to
pursue a court complaint, and are less likely to receive large monetary relief from juries.
Id. at 1488 (quoting Commission on the Future of Worker-Mgmt. Relations, U.S. Dep't of Labor &
U.S. Department of Commerce, Report and Recommendations 30 (1994)). See also Leader & Burger,
supra note 153, at 109 ("There is also evidence to suggest that employees more often prevail before an
arbitrator than in court, although their awards may be less in arbitration.").
157. See 2 Commercial Arbitration § 45:3 (2007).
158. See supra note 17.
159. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 358 (photo. reprint 1992) (1765); see also In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[1]t is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free.").
160. Leader & Burger, supra note 151, at Ill ("The agreement also may state that the employer bears
all costs. But even in this scenario, the employer comes out ahead, since the cost of arbitration is
significantly less than the cost of protracted litigation." (citing Linda Goodspeed, Litigation's Rising
Price Tag Boosts Arbitration's Appeal, Boston Bus. J., Oct. 4, 2002, available at <http:// bos-
ton.bizjoumals.com/boston/stories/2002/10/07/focus3.html> (last viewed July 7, 2004); Helen W.
Gunnarsson, Law Pulse, 90 ILL. B.J. 282, 285 (2002))).
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B. The Armendariz Per Se Rule is Consistent with the Federal Policy Fa-
voring Arbitration
In analyzing prohibitive costs allocation, pro-employee holdings often refer-
ence the extent to which the imposition of such costs frustrates the purpose of
federal anti-discrimination statutes.' 6' However, prohibitive cost allocation fru-
strates the purpose behind the federal policy favoring arbitration as established in
the FAA as well. 162 Commentators have dismissed the per se rule as being merely
reflective of a judicial bias against arbitration. 163 If one's view of the federal poli-
cy favoring arbitration is that it merely relieves the overcrowded docket of our
federal and state courts, then this dismissal is warranted: adhesive agreements
that subject an employee to the imposition of prohibitive costs will certainly re-
duce the amount of both litigation and arbitration. However, if one views the
federal policy favoring arbitration as the promotion of a valid tool for providing
disputants with a flexible, efficient means of resolving even complex disputes,
then it logically follows that unfair cost allocation provisions in mandatory adhe-
sion contracts frustrate the federal policy favoring arbitration by preventing plain-
tiffs from seeking redress of their claims in this forum. The deterrence of valid
claims serves only to undermine arbitration as a social institution, an outcome of
far greater consequence than requiring an employer to pay the arbitration costs of
a sophisticated wealthy employee that otherwise could have afforded such costs.
Setting aside the obvious point that there is no language in either Cole or Ar-
mendariz that evidences any actual bias toward arbitration, 64 the case-by-case
method unnecessarily undermines the federal policy.' 65 Employers understand the
cost advantages of arbitration, and arbitration would likely remain a more eco-
nomical choice for employers even if the employer was required to pay the em-
ployee's attorneys fees.' 66 In other words, even if all costs are per se assessed
against the employer, which the Armendariz rule does not require, employees'
claims still get to arbitration, thus satisfying the federal policy favoring arbitration
to a much greater extent than the other alternatives that deter the arbitration of
claims altogether.
In addition to accusations of bias, criticisms of the Armendariz per se rule
have offered precedent in place of logic by citing Gilmer as somehow precluding
any application of the rule.' 67 This issue can be resolved by returning to Judge
161. See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that defendant employer's mandatory arbitration agreement both restricted the employee's right to
a judicial forum while imposing prohibitive cost that limited access to the arbitral forum: "Such a
result clearly undermines the remedial and deterrent functions of the federal anti-discrimination
laws.").
162. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
163. Crawford, supra note 47, at 285; See generally Randall, supra note 102, at 203-09.
164. See Cole v. Burns Int'l. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
165. See supra note 18.
166. See supra note 160.
167. Crawford, supra note 47, at 285:
Per se denial of cost-splitting provisions is not in line with the Supreme Court's ruling in Gilmer,
where the Court upheld the judiciary's "liberal policy favoring arbitration." In Gilmer, the Court
"fully endorsed the use of arbitration for statutory claims," and therefore courts should always
attempt to allow arbitration in the appropriate circumstances. The per se denial approach does not
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Edwards' reasoned analysis in Cole, in which he reconciles the per se rule with
the holding in Gilmer:
[I]n Gilmer, the Supreme Court endorsed a system of arbitration in which
employees are not required to pay for the arbitrator assigned to hear their
statutory claims. There is no reason to think that the Court would have
approved arbitration in the absence of this arrangement. Indeed, we are
unaware of any situation in American jurisprudence in which a benefi-
ciary of a federal statute has been required to pay for the services of the
judge assigned to hear her or his case. Under Gilmer, arbitration is sup-
posed to be a reasonable substitute for a judicial forum. Therefore, it
would undermine Congress's intent to prevent employees who are seek-
ing to vindicate statutory rights from gaining access to a judicial forum
and then require them to pay for the services of an arbitrator when they
would never be required to pay for a judge in court. 168
While the above passage overflows with relevance to the post-Green Tree era
of employment arbitration, perhaps the most significant statement therein is the
clarification that in Gilmer, the Court was not considering an arbitration system in
which costs could be assessed against the employee. 69 The Court's citing of Gil-
mer as precedent for the Green Tree holding, 170 with no mention of the widely
accepted interpretation of Gilmer in Cole, represents an inadequate consideration
of the deterrence effect of cost allocation.' 7' The Armendariz per se rule, on the
other hand, promotes the arbitration of employment disputes by refusing to en-
force prohibitive costs provisions, which is far more consistent with Cole.
C. Potential Problems with the Armendariz Per Se Rule
1. The "Repeat-Player" Problem
Although the Armendariz per se rule is the only method of costs allocation
that effectively encompasses the public policy favoring arbitration, it is not with-
out its problems. 172 One negative aspect of this rule identified by the California
Supreme Court in Armendariz is the effect of requiring the employer to pay arbi-
tration costs on arbitrator neutrality.173 Crawford, however, broadens the scope of
this problem beyond the per se rule in his discussion of the results and ramifica-
tions of the Morrison decision:
follow this policy because the costs of arbitration do not always prohibit an employee from bring-
ing a claim against the employer.
Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
168. Cole v. Bums International Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
169. Id.
170. Green-Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
171. Malin, supra note 8, at 794; Crawford, supra note 47, at 286; Morrison v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663-65 (6th Cir. 2003).
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There is evidence to suggest that employers are often repeat players in
the arbitration system, while employees are usually only one-time play-
ers. If the repeat-player employers are always financing the arbitration,
some critics fear that arbitrators will be biased in favor of the employers
because it is the employers that pay the arbitrators' salaries. Further-
more, this seems to cut against the process that courts are attempting to
encourage-specifically, fair arbitration practices as a reasonable substi-
tute for the judicial forum. This criticism does not undermine the Sixth
Circuit's approach, however, because the "repeat-player system" can eas-
ily be remedied by allowing employees to seek resolution with an arbitra-
tor of her choice instead of using the employer's choice of arbitrator.'
74
While Crawford's assessment of the problem is accurate, his suggested reme-
dy may not be so easy: even in a system that allows the employee to choose her
own arbitrator, the arbitrator may still favor the repeat-player due to either pre-
vious contacts or the opportunity to establish a mutually beneficial relationship. 175
Fortunately, there are significant safeguards available that can ameliorate the im-
pact of the repeat-player problem. Summers provides the following solution:
The most obvious cure . . . would be the use of a public agency-such as
the FMCS [Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service]-or state media-
tion agencies to provide panels of arbitrators. Currently, the FMCS
maintains a large panel of arbitrators for grievance arbitration from
which it provides lists to the parties. It could have a second panel of
those to be used in individual employment cases, with arbitrators being
able to be on both panels. With these changes by the institutional pro-
viders, the implication of the Supreme Court-that arbitration is just
another forum-could, without any statutory changes, become true in
almost all respects.1
76
Also, in addressing arbitral neutrality, the Armendariz opinion rejects the idea
that the problem is directly implicated by the per se rule: "[I]t is not the fact that
the employer may pay an arbitrator that is most likely to induce bias, but rather the
fact that the employer is a "repeat player" in the arbitration system who is more
likely to be a source of business for the arbitrator."'' 77 This notion that arbitral
neutrality is at risk regardless of whether the employer is required to pay all or
some of the costs is certainly worthy of consideration. However, the court in Ar-
mendariz then goes on to legitimate the problem by highlighting the institutions-
such as state bar associations and the AAA-that are already in place to guard
against corrupt arbitrators. 78 Regardless of whether or not the problem of arbitral
neutrality is inherent in the per se rule or employment and consumer arbitration in
general, even if all of these approaches to mitigating forum bias are tried and
abandoned, common sense alone demands that an employee would rather face a
174. Crawford, supra note 47, at 286.
175. Summers, supra note 8, at 733.
176. Id.
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potentially biased arbitrator than to have zero access to any forum due to prohibi-
tive costs.
2. "The Armendariz Per Se Rule is Inherently Unfair to Employers"
By requiring the employee to pay all of the costs associated with litigation,
the employer's only argument that such a scenario unfairly favors the employee is
that the employee can now bring any and all claims in arbitration just as easily as
she could in litigation. In fact, the Armendariz per se rule does nothing to disturb
significant factors that tilt the system in the employer's favor: (1) Although a
plaintiff is more likely to prevail in arbitration, the award is typically less than that
of litigation, 179 which will deter some claimants, and (2) attorneys rarely take
claims to arbitration on a contingency fee basis. 18 The absence of this oft utilized
aspect of litigation is a serious deterrence to employees that are subject to a bind-
ing arbitration clause.'
8 1
3. "Severability Does Nothing to Address the In Terrorem Effect of Prohi-
bitive Cost Provisions"
The Eleventh Circuit's criticism in Perez v. Globe Airport Security Services,
Inc. 182 that widespread application of severability could in fact create an incentive
for employers to include unconscionable or unenforceable provisions is not with-
out merit. 183 Should the unsophisticated employee (or consumer) actually read the
arbitration agreement prior to consulting with an attorney, it is quite possible that
a prohibitive cost provision could deter the employee from filing suit.184 Howev-
er, in response to this criticism, it may be sufficient to consider which of the fol-
lowing scenarios is more likely: whether the unsophisticated employee would
scrutinize the arbitration agreement herself and subsequently decide not to seek
the assistance of counsel, or if similar to Jane in the above hypothetical, 185 the
employee would submit her employment agreement to an attorney without at-
tempting to form her own opinion as to its contents. Regardless of which is more
likely, the Armendariz per se rule at the very least ameliorates the deterrence ef-
fect for the plaintiff that chooses to pursue her claim despite being intimidated by
the employer's inclusion of a prohibitive cost provision.
179. Leader & Burger, supra note 151, at 109 ("There is also evidence to suggest that employees
more often prevail before an arbitrator than in court, although their awards may be less in arbitra-
tion.").
180. See Drahozal, supra note 5.
181. Id.
182. 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11 th Cir. 2001), vacated, 294 F.3d 1275 (2002).
183. Id.; see also Summers, supra note 8, at 730; Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract:
Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U.
PA. L. REv. 379 (2006).
184. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1287, vacated, 294 F.3d 1275 (2002).
185. See supra "Introduction."
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D. The Armendariz Per Se Rule As Compared to Other Alternatives For
Addressing the Impact of Prohibitive Costs
1. Contingency Fees
Lawyers typically do not take arbitration cases on a contingency fee basis,
and at least one commentator has suggested that doing so would effectively ame-
liorate the deterrence effect of prohibitive costs provisions. 86 In the article Arbi-
tration Costs and Contingency Fee Contracts, Christopher R. Drahozal sets forth
both economical and ethical reasons for lawyers to take arbitration cases on a
contingency fee basis.1 87 Such a shift in practices would likely provide a substan-
tial increase in plaintiffs' access to arbitration. Likewise, the analysis herein con-
tains nothing to disagree with this aspect of Drahozal's assessment, particularly
due to the fact that claimants who are not as prone to saving money as Jane1
88
would be deterred from pursuing a claim in arbitration as a result of attorney's
fees alone. However, to the extent that Drahozal's thesis could be understood as
proposing the proliferation of contingency fees as a cure-all to the deterrence ef-
fect of judicial review of costs allocation, there are two significant problems with
this interpretation: (1) Drahozal's appeal to the ethical and economical considera-
tions of attorneys, as a normative matter, is commendable; however, prescriptively
speaking, there is no guarantee that his ideas will catch on, and (2) the plaintiffs
attorney being willing to foot the upfront costs of arbitration will not inspire the
risk averse plaintiff that understands the possibility of being assessed such costs
by the arbitrator. The Armendariz per se rule addresses the above problems by
removing the possibility of prohibitive costs altogether without relying on the
ethical or economical judgment of the individual practitioner.
2. State Law Contract Defenses
The FAA also preserves a plaintiffs right to state law contract defenses such
as "unconscionability" and "breach of contract," and the argument could be made
that such defenses preclude the need for the Armendariz per se rule. 8 9 While
these remedies stand as potential tools for the plaintiff that is subject to an adhe-
sive arbitration agreement, as Richard A. Bales points out in his article The Lais-
sez-Faire Arbitration Market and the Need for a Uniform Federal Standard Go-
verning Employment and Consumer Arbitration, the application of these defenses
is considerably inconsistent. 90 The Armendariz per se rule avoids the deterrence
effect of inconsistent application that is inherent in the state law defenses. Fur-
thermore, the proving of such a defense would require significant, resource-
186. See generally Drahozal, supra note 5.
187. Drahozal, supra note 5, at 738-40.
188. See supra "Introduction".
189. Bales, supra note 17, at 609-13.
190. Id. at 618 ("[T]here is still a significant degree of inconsistent authority, not only on the issue of
what the proper source of authority for refusing to enforce one-sided arbitration agreements should be,
but also on the issue of which arbitration agreements go "over the line" and are unenforceable.").
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consuming judicial review for the low-income plaintiff, which again implicates a
deterrence impact due to double-layered costs. 191
3. Bales' Argument for Amending the FAA
Bales' solution to the inconsistency of state law defenses is to amend the
FAA to include a "Bill of Rights" that will govern due process in arbitration.
192
The argument could be made that such an amendment would preclude the need for
the Armendariz per se rule. Bales references previously drafted suggestions for
amending the FAA193 as well as adding his own long list of demands. 194 While
such an amendment to the FAA may in fact effectively address the issue of prohi-
bitive costs in the long term and thereby preclude the need for the Armendariz per
se rule, the political process involves the consideration of numerous competing
interests. 195 Such considerations make the outcome of attempting to amend the
FAA unpredictable. As such, the courts should not wait for Congress and instead
simply take advantage of the judicial tools that are already available for managing
the disparate impact of adhesive arbitration agreements-the Armendariz per se
rule.
4. Application of the Lawyer's Duty to the Public Justice System to the
Drafting of Employment Arbitration Agreements
In his article Ethical Concerns in Drafting Employment Arbitration Agree-
ments After Circuit City and Green Tree, Professor Martin H. Malin makes an
ethical appeal similar to that of Drahozal by arguing that the drafting of arbitration
agreements is one of the rare situations in which the attorney's duty to the public
justice system is a significant limitation on the duty to the client., 96 Malin appeals
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) for the proposition that it is
each lawyer's individual determination as to how to strike the balance between
"responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in
191. See generally Bales, supra note 17.
192. Bales, supra note 17, at 627-29. Summers calls for similar measures. Summers, supra note 8, at
732.
193. "Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the
Employment Relationship," in Arnold M. Zack, The Evolution of the Employment Protocol, 50 Disp.
RESOL. J. 36, 36 (1995); "National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, Consumer Due Process
Protocol" (Apr. 17, 1998), available at http://www.adr.org/sp/asp?id=22019 (last visited Oct. 13,
2007).
194. Bales, supra note 17, at 629.
I believe, for example, that the "bill of rights" should strictly limit cost-splitting, should reject filing
fees payable from consumers and employees to companies and employers, should reject alterations to
statutory statutes of limitation, should permit class actions in arbitration on the same basis as class
actions currently are permitted in court, should limit the ability of the company or employer to unilate-
rally modify the arbitration agreement and the underlying arbitral procedures, and should guarantee the
selection of neutral arbitrators.
195. Id. ("Notwithstanding my opinion on how each of these issues should be resolved, the statute
should instead reflect the give-and-take of input from various constituencies as part of the political
process.") (emphasis added).
196. Malin, supra note 8, at 804-18.
[Vol. 2007
24
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2007, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2007/iss2/7
Beyond "Let Them Eat Cake"
remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory living."' 197 As commend-
able a point as Malin makes in this article, the conventional wisdom that absolute
power corrupts absolutely demands more than the MRPC for policing arbitration
agreements. The federal policy favoring arbitration has been flogged to the point
of allowing employers to do generally whatever they want short of hand-picking
their own panel of arbitrators.' 98 Therefore, as a prescriptive matter, it is unwise
to rely upon lawyers to draft arbitration agreements that don't favor their clients to
the extent allowed by law.199 Until either the Supreme Court's rejection of Green
Tree or amendment of the FAA, Malin's approach is essential to assuring arbitral
fairness, but it does not carry the assurance of the Armendariz per se rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
One's view of the per se rule could vary depending upon one's accepted in-
terpretation of the federal policy favoring arbitration: is this a policy that merely
relieves the federal docket or is this a policy that acknowledges arbitration as a
forum that is rife with potential benefits for both plaintiff and defendant? If one
takes the latter view, then the idea that the federal policy favoring arbitration re-
quires the enforcement or consideration of prohibitive costs provisions is untena-
ble-the deterrence effect on innumerable employees and consumers will discou-
rage arbitration on the whole. However, if courts and legislators embrace the
Armendariz per se rule while allowing for the severance of prohibitive costs pro-
visions, the plaintiff at least gets in the door to arbitration, and the debate as to
Judge Edwards' other four criteria200 for an enforceable arbitration agreement can
continue. If not, countless other employees and consumers such as Jane will walk
away from the opportunity to vindicate their statutory rights, deterred by the
double-layered prohibitive costs of proving their right to be in the arbitral forum
in the first place.
DAN O'HEARN
197. Id. at 815 (citing Model Rules of Prof I Conduct, pmbl. 8 (2002)).
198. See, e.g., Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that an
employer materially breached an agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims when it promulgated
arbitration rules that required that all arbitrators be selected from list created by employer and placed
no limits on whom employer could place on list).
199. Malin, supra note 8, at 800-01.
The lawyer's intuitive reaction to Green Tree and subsequent legal developments will be to use them to
justify drafting the arbitration agreement to maximize the employer's advantage. Draft the arbitration
agreement to require employees to pay half the costs of the proceeding, limit such remedies as attorney
fees and punitive damages, provide discovery procedures that favor the employer and require claims to
be filed within a short period of time. Avoid the blatantly gross, such as the Hooters model .... In
representing a client, a lawyer's obligation is "zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate
interests, within the bounds of the law."
Id.
200. For example, how arbitration agreements can better "(1) provide[] for neutral arbitrators, (2)
provide[] for more than minimal discovery, (3) require[] a written award, and (4)[] provide for all of
the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court .. " Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105
F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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